A Structural Balance Sheet Model of Sovereign Credit Risk by François, Pascal et al.
      
François: Associate Professor of Finance, HEC Montréal and CIRPÉE Research Fellow. Postal address: HEC 
Montréal, Department of Finance, 3000 Cote-Ste-Catherine, Montreal, Canada H3T 2A7 
pascal.francois@hec.ca 
Hübner: The Deloitte Professor of Financial Management, HEC Management School – University of Liège; 
Associate Professor of Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Maastricht University; Chief 
Scientific Officer, Gambit Financial Solutions. Postal address: HEC Management School – University of Liège, 14 
rue Louvrex, Bâtiment 1, B-4000 Liège, Belgium 
g.hubner@ulg.ac.be 
Sibille: Senior Consultant Riskdynamics. Postal address: Riskdynamics, 47-48 Boulevard du Régent, B-1000 
Brussels, Belgium 
JSibille@riskdynamics.eu 
 
We thank Alexandre Jeanneret for helpful discussions. Part of this research was completed while Jean-Roch Sibille 
was a Fellow of the Belgian Intercollegiate Center for Management Science (ICM). Pascal François acknowledges 
the financial support of SSHRC. Georges Hübner acknowledges the financial support of Deloitte Luxembourg. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 11-41 
 
 
 
A Structural Balance Sheet Model of Sovereign Credit Risk 
 
 
Pascal François 
Georges Hübner 
Jean-Roch Sibille 
 
 
 
Décembre/December 2011 
 
Abstract:  
This article studies sovereign credit spreads using a contingent claims model and a 
balance sheet representation of the sovereign economy. Analytical formulae for 
domestic and external debt values as well as for the financial guarantee are derived in a 
framework where recovery rate is endogenously determined as the solution of a 
strategic bargaining game. The approach allows to relate sovereign credit spreads to 
observable macroeconomic factors, and in particular accounts for contagion effects 
through the corporate and banking sectors. Pricing performance as well as predictions 
about credit spread determinants are successfully tested on the Brazilian economy. 
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1 Introduction
In situations of financial turmoil, the assessment of sovereign credit risk plays an important
role. It is a key challenge for countries to develop comprehensive models that are able
to better understand and help prevent financial crisis. In order to provide a reasonable
picture of a national economy, these models must reflect not only the dynamics of the public
sector, but also the evolution of the private sector. In particular, the financial function filled
by the banking system enables the sovereign government to interact with companies and
households, but also with foreign lenders.
In this paper, we propose an inter-sectorial sovereign model of default risk that takes
into account these interactions between the public, private, and banking sectors. Our mod-
eling framework belongs to the stream of "structural-form models" because they analyze
directly the evolution of underlying structural variables to determine the time, the proba-
bility or the distance to default. In this article, we adapt this approach to the credit risk
of a sovereign economy, and identify specific parameters which can lead to a default by a
sovereign borrower. For this purpose, we follow the approach of Gapen et al. (2005), and
Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007, 2008). These authors view the economy as interconnected
sectors represented by portfolios of assets, liabilities, and guarantees. This "balance sheet"
approach has the benefit of a wider perception of the sovereign default mechanism and
therefore enriches the set of determinants on sovereign credit spreads.
One of our major contributions is to implement the balance sheet approach of the
sovereign economy by use of the contingent claims analysis (CCA). The CCA was originally
applied to assess the default probability of corporate entities. However, major diﬀerences
exist between a country and a corporate default. For instance, if a firm can go bankrupt
and literally cease to exist, such is not the case for a sovereign. Sovereign government can
decide, for any value of national corporate assets, whether it has the incentive to default
entirely, partially, or not at all on its foreign debt. To capture the full extent of this issue,
we develop a Rubinstein (1982) type of strategic game played between the country and
foreign debtholders. An endogenous recovery rate is obtained from the equilibrium of this
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game.
Building on the works by Gapen et al. (2005), Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007, 2008), we
consider that the sovereign economy can be divided into three sectors: Corporate (including
households), banking and public (government plus monetary authorities). In this setup, a
sovereign crisis can have three possible origins. All three scenarios have in common that
they ultimately put a stress on public liabilities, mainly on the financial guarantee, thereby
triggering sovereign default.
1. Shocks on the corporate sector. A decrease in the value of corporate assets reduces
the wealth of banks who have claims on them. This, in turn, might increase the
value of the financial guarantee, putting the sovereign in a more diﬃcult financial
situation. A similar eﬀect can result from a shock in corporate leverage. Under-
leveraged corporations induce a loss in profitability for lending banks. This, again,
might require the contribution of the financial guarantee.
2. Shock on the banking sector. Following a major financial distress like a bank run or
a systemic default, the value of deposits decreases, which increases the value of the
financial guarantee (put on deposits). Another stress can stem from domestic debt —
to the extent that it is held for the most part by banks.
3. Shock on the public sector. In the case of a cut in fiscal revenues, a distress in the
pension plan or a loss in foreign reserves, the sovereign can be hit directly. Note
that fiscal revenues are intimately related to the size of corporate assets (including
households).
After calibrating the model to a plausible representative sovereign economy, we derive
testable implications regarding the determinants of sovereign credit spreads. In particular,
we emphasize the contagion eﬀect from the corporate sector on the cost of external financ-
ing. This contagion eﬀect can be direct (through a shock on corporate assets) or indirect
(through a change in corporate leverage). As far as the banking sector is concerned, we
measure the contagion eﬀect on sovereign credit spreads via changes in deposits. The model
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also explicitly values the financial guarantee which acts as a buﬀer between the banking
and the public sectors.
Our approach is then empirically tested on the Brazilian economy. The model-implied
credit spreads track the observed data reasonably well. In addition, most of the model
predictions about the determinants of sovereign credit spreads (including contagion eﬀects)
are validated by a regression analysis.
Our paper stands at the cornerstone of two strands of literature. On the one hand, early
CCA models have been applied to analyze sovereign credit risk. Kulatilaka and Marcus
(1987) model the timing of sovereign strategic default as a first-hitting time problem using
sovereign GDP as state variable. They do not examine the possibility of renegotiating debt
terms upon default. The model by Cohen (1993) examines the value of a debt write-oﬀ,
using the sovereign capacity to pay (expressed as a fraction of GDP) as the state variable.
Hayri (2000) and Gibson and Sundaresan (2000) value sovereign debt in a contingent
claims model where the defaulting sovereign is exposed to sanctions. These models show
that there exists a value of waiting to default, which may explain the evidence of many
sovereigns being deeply on the “wrong” side of the debt Laﬀer curve. The contingent
claims model in Jeanneret (2011) uses the sovereign stock market index to analyze credit
spreads at the daily frequency. All of these CCA models view default as a first-hitting time
problem and therefore can only account for one sovereign default. In our setup, we allow
for multiple sovereign defaults every time the state variable falls below the endogenous
default threshold. This more realistic modeling approach is capable of generating higher
credit spreads, since creditors anticipate their exposure to repeated defaults. On the other
hand, more recent macroeconomic contributions model a small open economy to relate
sovereign income, consumption and risk aversion to credit spreads. These works include
Arellano (2008) and Yue (2010).
This paper is divided into five sections. In section 2, we present a comprehensive
balance sheet representation of the sovereign economy. We apply the contingent claims
analysis to value the components that connect the various accounts of the balance sheet,
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including corporate, domestic and external debts, as well as the financial guarantee. We
also model the renegotiation process of sovereign default as a game between the sovereign
and foreign debtholders. In the third section, we conduct a numerical analysis of the
model to investigate the determinants of sovereign credit spreads. In section 4, the model
is empirically tested on the Brazilian economy. Section 5 concludes. Technical derivations
are gathered in the appendix.
2 The sovereign economy with contagion eﬀects
This section proposes an intuitive view of an economy in a balance sheet framework. After
developing the diﬀerent elements, we apply the CCA to relate the whole economy to a
single stochastic variable, namely the corporate assets.
Figure 1 provides a balance sheet representation of the sovereign economy.
Insert Figure 1 here
Throughout we use the term "corporate" to designate the industry sector as a whole.
The corporate sector therefore accounts for the country’s real activity. The contingent
claims model developed in the next section will use industrial production flow as the state
variable. When the time comes for model calibration, we will typically use GDP statistics
to proxy for the dynamics of the sovereign industrial production.
For simplicity, the banking sector accounts for the country’s commercial banking ac-
tivity. Also, we assume that only the public sector has access to world financial markets
(see e.g. Cohen, 1991).
Note that the financial guarantee is included in sovereign equity. This is equivalent
to assuming that, in case banks are in financial distress, the sovereign will dig into her
pockets to trigger the financial guarantee and keep the banking system afloat.1 Prior
1 In particular, the sovereign could increase the fiscal pressure or use her monetary prerogative, which
would both increase public assets. Adding an endogenous fiscal and/or monetary policy is a challenging
macroeconomic extension of the present work.
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evidence on sovereign debt crises suggests that emerging countries in financial diﬃculty
with their external creditors preserve the stability of their banking system.
In our model, we focus on a shock coming from the corporate assets. We could extend
the model to consider the public assets or the bank deposits as additional variables. How-
ever, to obtain a clear prospective and to simplify the interconnections inside the balance
sheet, we work only with one stochastic variable, and keep the other inputs (bank deposits
and public assets) fixed.
2.1 Contingent claims analysis
2.1.1 Notations and assumptions
The following assumptions are needed in order to use the CCA to depict the dynamics of
the key balance sheet components.
Assumption 1: Public domestic debt, as well as foreign debt, are perpetuities with con-
tinuous debt service.
We denote by  and  the continuous debt service oﬀered by domestic and foreign
debts, respectively.
Assumption 2: Domestic investors are exposed to an idiosyncratic source of risk that
they cannot diversify away (see assumption 3 below). Foreign lenders, by contrast, have
unrestricted access to international capital markets.
A similar assumption can be found in sovereign debt models such as Arellano (2008) or
Yue (2010). A direct consequence is that the rate of time preference of domestic investors
is higher than that of foreign investors (typically large international financial institutions).
We denote by  ( ) the rate at which domestic (foreign) investors discount all future
payoﬀs. Following assumption 2, we have that   .
Assumption 3: The value of sovereign industrial production flow, denoted by  , follows
a geometric Brownian motion
 ()
 () = +  ()  (1)
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where  is the drift rate,  is the standard deviation and  represents a Wiener process.
Consequently, the value of the whole corporate sector is that of a perpetuity with initial
flow  , growing at rate  and discounted at rate . That is, the whole corporate sector is
worth

 − 
Assumption 4: If the sovereign repudiates her debt, foreign lenders impose sanctions
such that the drift of sovereign industrial production drops to 2  .
Evidence on drops in sovereign GDP growth rate after default is found in Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2008) and Borensztein and Panizza (2008).
Assumption 5: The corporate sector is leveraged and corporate debt is a perpetuity with
continuous coupon . Let us denote by  the critical threshold at which the corporate
sector defaults on its debt. At this point, the country’s assets are reorganized under the su-
pervision of domestic lenders (and we assume corporate equityholders leave with nothing).2
Assumption 6: The domestic banking sector is responsible for all corporate loans. Ad-
ditionally, these loans are exclusively financed by deposits (pure commercial banking). We
further assume that deposits generate a continuous flow  accruing to bank account own-
ers.
Bank assets consist of all corporate loans, the public domestic debt and the public
financial guarantee. As proposed by Ronn and Verma (1986), we see the financial guarantee
as a put option on bank assets ensuring that the government intervenes if the bank assets
fall below the value of the deposits. This provision guarantees that the savings from the
corporate sector are safe.
Assumption 7: The sovereign will enter into renegotiations with domestic and foreign
creditors every time the value of industrial production flow falls below a critical level .
Domestic and foreign debts are treated equally during renegotiations, that is, they exhibit
the same priority level and the same negotiated recovery rate. Specifically, during debt
2For simplicity, we assume that reorganization of the whole corporate sector may occur only once over
the infinite horizon. As a consequence, the timing of corporate reorganization is modeled as a first-hitting
time. We leave the case for repeated failures of the corporate sector as an extension of the model.
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renegotiations, debt service is reduced to  for domestic debt and to  for foreign debt
with 0    1.
Given there is no clear evidence in the literature of a systematically higher domestic re-
covery rate compared to the foreign recovery rate (or the opposite),3 we rely on Assumption
7 to keep the model tractable without giving away its potential insights.
2.1.2 Valuation
The critical threshold for renegotiation () will be first regarded as exogenous, but it will
later be made endogenous. Under previous assumptions, the values of domestic debt ()
and foreign debt ( ) are given by (see Appendix for a proof)
 () =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩

 −
(1−)
Ψ+
¡

¢Φ+
 for   

 +
(1−)
Ψ−
¡

¢−Φ− for  ≤ 
for  =   and with
Φ+− =
q
2 + 2 ± 
Ψ+− = 2 + 2 ± 
q
2 + 2
 =  − 2
For corporate debt, we obtain
 ( ) =  −
µ
 −

 − 
¶µ

¶Φ+

,
and the value of corporate equity is therefore
 ( ) =  −  − ( )  (2)
3Gelpern and Setser (2004) provide evidence of preference given to domestic lenders as in the case of
Russia in 1998 as well as Turkey in 2001. However, they conclude that domestic and foreign lenders were
treated equally after the Uruguayan default in 2003. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) cannot reject the
assumption of equal treatment between domestic and foreign lenders on a sample of 10 debt restructurings
in 6 countries.
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Optimal default threshold for corporate equityholders is given by the smooth pasting con-
dition
 ( ( ))

¯¯¯¯
=
= 0
Which yields
 ∗ =  ( − )
Φ+
 +Φ+

For the banking sector to be viable, it must be that the cash flow received from bor-
rowers exceeds the one due to depositors. That is,
 +   
However, in times of debt renegotiations, the financial health of the banking sector is
jeopardized if
 +   
This is when the financial guarantee intervenes. It makes up for the diﬀerence between
the cash flow due to depositors and the cash flow actually received by banks. Hence,
the financial guarantee pays the coupon  −  −  (if positive) every time sovereign
debt is being renegotiated. The value of the financial guarantee is therefore given by (see
Appendix)
 () =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max(0−−)
Ψ+
¡

¢Φ+
 for   
max(0−−)
 −
max(0−−)
Ψ−
¡

¢−Φ− for  ≤ 
From the banking balance sheet equality, banking equity is worth
 () =  (  ∗ ) + () + ( )−   (3)
Figure 2 presents the balance sheet of the sovereign economy using the contingent claims
we have introduced and valued.
Insert Figure 2 here
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2.2 The debt renegotiation game
Every time sovereign industrial production hits the renegotiation threshold , we assume
that a bargaining game takes place between the sovereign state and foreign lenders. Fol-
lowing Hayri (2000), we consider a Rubinstein (1982) type of game where the two parties
take turns to make oﬀers. In this type of game, Rubinstein (1982) shows that the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is an immediate agreement in which the renegotiation surplus
is shared according to the diﬀerence of rate of time preference. That is, foreign creditors
get a fraction
 − 
 − +  − 
of the renegotiation surplus which is the avoidance of economic sanctions, i.e.

 −  −

 − 2 
Consequently, the equilibrium recovery rate is ∗ such that what foreign creditors
recover equals the fraction of the renegotiation surplus granted to them. This recovery is
equivalent to a payment stream of ∗ every time  is below  valued at the renegotiation
point (when  = ). From earlier calculations, we therefore obtain that ∗ is such that
∗
Ψ+
=
 − 
 − +  − 
µ 
 −  −

 − 2
¶

which yields
∗ = 
Ψ+
 − +  − 
− 2
 − 2  (4)
To determine the optimal renegotiation threshold, we assume that the sovereign gov-
ernment aims to maximize the value of the whole nation’s net wealth, that is the sum of
corporate, banking and sovereign equities.4 From our balance sheet analysis in Figure 2,
the sovereign therefore aims at maximizing the following
 ( ) +  () +  − ()− () 
4Alternate specifications of the model could consider putting weights on the three types of equity,
reflecting the sovereign government’s political priorities.
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Applying the smooth-pasting condition
 ( ( ) +  () +  − ()− ( ))

¯¯¯¯
=
= 0
yields
∗ =  − 
µq
2 + 2 + 
¶
max (0  −  − ∗)³
2 + 2 + 
p
2 + 2
´
+
 − 

µq
2 + 2 + 
¶
(1− ∗) 
2 + 2 + 
q
2 + 2

If  −  −  ≤ 0, i.e.  ≥ − then the expression for sovereign default threshold
simplifies into
∗ =  − 
µq
2 + 2 + 
¶
(1− ∗) 
2 + 2 + 
q
2 + 2

Combining this result with equation (4) yields
∗ = Φ
+
Ψ+ 
µ 
 −  +
Φ+ (− 2)
( − +  − ) ( − 2)
¶

and
∗ = Φ
+ (− 2) ( − )
 ( − +  − ) ( − 2) +Φ+ (− 2) ( − ) 
Note that in this case, the financial guarantee is not activated ( −  −  ≤ 0). As
a result, there is no stress on the banking sector and therefore, the sovereign decision to
default (∗) only depends on external indebtedness ( ). Furthermore, since the sovereign
default threshold is linear in  , the optimal recovery rate is constant across all external
debt levels.
If  −  −   0, i.e.   − then the expression for sovereign default threshold is
now
∗ =  − 
µq
2 + 2 + 
¶  −  − ∗³
2 + 2 + 
p
2 + 2
´
+
 − 

µq
2 + 2 + 
¶
(1− ∗) 
2 + 2 + 
q
2 + 2

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Rearranging and plugging the expression for ∗ from equation (4) yields
∗ =  − 
µΦ ( − )
Ψ +
Φ
Ψ
¶

µ
1 +
 − 

− 2
 − 2
ΦΨ +ΦΨ
Ψ ( − +  − ) 
¶

and
∗ =
µ Ψ
 − +  − 
¶µ − 2
 − 2
¶  − 

µΦ ( − )
Ψ +
Φ
Ψ
¶

µ
1 +
 − 

− 2
 − 2
ΦΨ +ΦΨ
Ψ ( − +  − ) 
¶

In this case, the financial guarantee has a strict positive value and the banking sector
is under stress. As a result, a contagion eﬀect makes the sovereign decision to default
dependent on external, domestic and corporate indebtedness. Since the relation between
the default threshold and external indebtedness is not linear, the optimal recovery rate will
depend on  in this case.
3 Numerical analysis
3.1 Model calibration
The model relies on nine country-specific parameters plus the world interest rate ( ).
All parameters are proxied with variables from the World Development Indicators — an
extensive dataset administrated by the World Bank. These annual proxies are expressed
as a percentage of GDP, which allows us to apply the model with a state variable normalized
to  = 100.5 Table 1 lists our selected variables and the parameter they account for.
Insert Table 1 here
5Note that, as far as model development is concerned, the state variable has been assimilated to the sov-
ereign industrial production flow. But calibration to the data requires scaling the model to sovereign GDP.
Hence, we numerically investigate shocks on sovereign GDP, but their eﬀects are qualitatively equivalent
to shocks on industrial production flow.
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Average GDP growth is a proxy for parameter . Parameter  is proxied by external
debt stock which is the sum of public, publicly-guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed
long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. We use the domestic credit pro-
vided by the banking sector to account for . We follow a similar procedure for parameter
 using the domestic credit to the private sector. Deposits are proxied by the variable
"Broad Money," which mainly consists of currency outside banks, demand deposits other
than those of the central government, the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of
resident sectors other than the central government.
The country-specific estimation procedure for volatility involves time series of daily
sovereign credit spreads, and is detailed in the empirical analysis section. It is based on
the iterative procedure developed by KMV Corporation (2002) and Vassalou and Xing
(2004) among others.
Finally, empirical work from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) and Borensztein and
Panizza (2008) documents that the sovereign GDP growth rate typically falls after a default.
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) report a drop of between 0.5 and 2 percentage points.
Borensztein and Panizza (2008) find an average drop of 1.2 percentage points. Accordingly,
we simply set
2 = − 001
Note that the value for the world interest rate is obtained as the average 3-month U.S.
Treasury Bill rate (obtained from the Federal Reserve of St-Louis).
Numerical implementation of the model is illustrated with data from a selection of
major participants in the sovereign debt market over the 1995—2009 period.6 Table 2
reports the average values of the proxies for the model parameters. For the sole purpose of
model simulation, the standard deviation of annual GDP log-returns will serve as a crude
proxy for volatility. Although the selected sovereign countries display a growth rate and
a volatility within a relatively narrow range, Table 2 shows great discrepancy in debt and
6Statistics for 2010 were not available at the time of data extraction.
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deposit levels. In this context, the base case scenario reflects a plausible calibration for a
moderately indebted country.
Insert Table 2 here
In the base case indeed, we obtain that the distance-to-default (defined as 100∗) is
around 1.25. Given that the state variable drift and volatility are 3% and 20% respectively,
this implies that the sovereign has an approximately 24% chance of defaulting within a year.
Endogenous recovery rate is 11%. This figure is in the same magnitude as the endogenous
recovery rates obtained by Jeanneret (2011) for sovereigns with high bargaining power
(which is, arguably, the case for our selected countries). Across all types of sovereign
defaulters however, recovery rates reported by Moody’s (2009) are slightly higher (around
30% on average). Base case sovereign credit spread is around 120 basis points, reflecting
the moderately safe situation of the sovereign.
3.2 Determinants of sovereign credit spreads
Figures 3 and 4 represent how model-implied sovereign credit spreads react to shocks in
model inputs. In these simulations, the sovereign credit spread () is defined as
 =  (∗ ∗) −   (5)
A sovereign with a higher rate of time preference will apply a bigger discount on external
debt, hence credit spread increases with . The same eﬀect applies to foreign creditors
who should demand a higher risk premium as  increases. At the same time, however, an
increase in  lowers the endogenous default threshold and raises the endogenous recovery
rate. Overall, these two eﬀects more than oﬀset the discounting eﬀect, hence credit spreads
are mainly decreasing with  (except for very small values) — which is a standard prediction
in contingent claims models. Intuitively, sovereign credit spreads decrease with  and
increase with , since declining and more volatile industrial revenues make sovereign default
more likely. Note that the recovery rate is a decreasing function of volatility (figure not
reported), which is in line with the theoretical predictions of Jeanneret (2011).
14
A small increase in low values of  raises the credit spread in a linear fashion (see
Figure 4). This is because the endogenous default threshold and recovery rate are mostly
unaﬀected. However, as external debt becomes significant, the increase in credit spread is
more than linear as the likelihood and severity of default are directly aﬀected. Figure 4
shows the model is flexible enough to generate relatively high spreads (several hundreds of
basis points) given a shock on external debt level. The adequacy of model-implied credit
spreads with actual spreads will be examined more in depth in the empirical analysis
section.
Figure 4 also illustrates some contagion eﬀects captured by our contingent claims model.
Most interesting is the eﬀect stemming from the corporate sector in the sovereign economy.
If it is under-leveraged, then bank assets are weakened and the financial guarantee has a
strict positive value. This causes sovereign credit spreads to rise. Beyond a certain level
of corporate debt (around 25% of GDP in our base case), banks’ lending activity covers
the remuneration of deposits and the sovereign financial sector is sound — leaving sovereign
credit spreads unaﬀected by additional corporate leverage. The bottom left graph of Figure
4 therefore sheds light on a cascade eﬀect. If corporate activity is slowing down, the negative
shock on GDP can be accentuated by a reduction in corporate debt service (because some
companies cannot actually pay their debt) that weakens the financial health of the banking
sector, activates the financial guarantee, and further increases sovereign credit spreads.
A similar contagion eﬀect originating from the banking sector is depicted in the bottom
right graph of Figure 4. If deposit flows increase to a certain level (around 35% of GDP
in our base case), this will put sovereign banks under stress and activate the financial
guarantee, which, in turn, makes external debt more risky.
Unfortunately, the model predicts no direct contagion eﬀect from the domestic debt
level (see the top right graph of Figure 4). This is because we have assumed that domestic
debt is neutral in the sovereign decision to default. Capturing this additional source of
contagion risk is an interesting avenue for extending this work.
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4 Case study of the Brazilian economy
In this section we gauge the model’s ability to replicate realistic time series of sovereign
credit spreads. We use Brazil as the reference country for our empirical illustration. Figure
5 shows the evolution of , ,  and  for this country over the 1995—2009 period. Brazil
has significantly increased its level of domestic debt throughout the sample period. Deposits
have followed a similar pattern. The country experienced a momentary surge in its external
indebtedness in the beginning of the 2000s. The corporate debt level has mirrored that of
external debt.
Insert Figure 5 here
Brazilian credit spreads are proxied by the JP Morgan EMBI (Emerging Market Bond
Index) Brazil spread available from Datastream. The model is challenged to replicate this
time series at the monthly frequency. To this end, all annual data from the World Bank
Indicators are converted into monthly data using linear interpolation.
4.1 Volatility estimation
To estimate the model’s volatility, we follow the iterative procedure developed by KMV
Corporation (2002) or Vassalou and Xing (2004) among others. In a first step, we compute
the volatility b1 as the standard deviation of log-returns on observed credit spreads over
one year. In step 2, the formula for the theoretical spread (equation (5)) is numerically
inverted (using volatility b1) to retrieve the state variable value ( ) which allows to match
the formula with the observed spread. These repeated inversions (over one year) yield a
time series for  (step 3). Computing the standard deviation of log-returns on  yields
a new estimate for volatility b2. We can now repeat steps 2 and 3 using b2 as the new
volatility estimate. This will yield another volatility estimate b3, and so on and so forth.
The procedure stops when two consecutive volatility estimates diﬀer by less than a tolerance
threshold (set at 10-6 in our case). Figure 6 shows the results for estimated volatility.
Insert Figure 6 here
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The iterative estimation procedure is applied once every year (from January to De-
cember), yielding a volatility estimate at the end of the year. Monthly volatility is then
obtained by linear interpolation.
Brazil stands amongst the risky sovereign borrowers. In quiet times, volatility estimates
reach a low of 30%. In turbulent times however (most notably the sequels of the 1998
Russian crisis and the 1999—2002 Argentinian crisis), these estimates climb to 60% or even
80%.
4.2 Pricing performance
Repeated application of equation (5) on a monthly basis generates model-implied sovereign
credit spreads. In Figure 7, we compare these spreads with actual ones.
Insert Figure 7 here
Overall, the model does a reasonably good job in tracking the evolution of observed
spreads. The most notable failure is the brutal spike in observed spreads which occurred
during 2002 that the model fails to capture. Because the model is fed with smoothed
annual data from the World Bank, its ability to adjust to short-lived episodes is limited.
Arguably, the model could fit the data even closer if it were using higher frequency (i.e.
more timely) inputs.
The mean error is slightly positive (62 basis points or 11% in relative terms), indicating
that the model is apparently not biased towards under- or over-valuation. The root mean
squared error (RMSE) is 241 basis points (37% in relative terms), and is rather substantial,
which, again, can be attributed to the low frequency of inputs.
4.3 Regression analysis
We assess the quality of model predictions regarding the determinants of sovereign credit
spreads by use of regressions. The first four specifications test for the explanatory power
of the model’s outputs, namely the theoretical credit spreads, the default threshold and
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the recovery rate. Specifications 1 and 3 can be written as follows
ln (_) = 1 + 1 ln () + 1
ln (_) = 2 + 2 + 2∗ + 2
where _ stands for the JP Morgan EMBI Brazil credit spread observed at month ,
 is the model-implied credit spreads,  is the endogenous distance-to-default (i.e.
100∗ ), and ∗ is the endogenous recovery rate. Specifications 2 and 4 are the same
regressions augmented with time-fixed eﬀects (captured by annual dummies).
Next, we test for the explanatory power of credit spread determinants identified by the
model. Thus, specification 5 is
ln (_) = 3 +3 + 3
with  = {         }. Specification 6 includes time-fixed eﬀects.
Table 3 reports the regression results.
Insert Table 3 here
We first note the relatively high explanatory power of the model-implied credit spreads.
After controlling for time-fixed eﬀects, the theoretical credit spread variations account for
nearly 85% of actual credit spread variations. In comparison, the adjusted R-squares
obtained in similar regressions by Hilscher and Nosbuch (2010), Jeanneret (2011), and Yue
(2010) are 45%, 75% and 78%, respectively.
As expected, the endogenous recovery rate has a significant negative impact on credit
spreads, which should also be the case for the distance-to-default. Unfortunately, when
time-fixed eﬀects are included, the significant and positive coeﬃcient comes at odds with
model predictions. This anomaly may be explained by the relatively high correlation
between the two regressors (+0.579 and significant at the 1% confidence level).
The predicted impacts of the sovereign discount rate (), world interest rate ( ), and
volatility () on credit spreads are strongly supported by the regression analysis and are
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robust to time-fixed eﬀects. The drift eﬀect is also properly captured but is not robust to
time-fixed eﬀects.
The contagion eﬀect via the corporate sector is validated only when time-fixed eﬀects
are accounted for. By contrast, the contagion eﬀect via deposits is not detected in the
Brazilian data. The regression analysis on this country also shows that the potential
contagion eﬀect via domestic debt (), which the model ignores, does not seem to matter
much, as it is weakly detected (at the 10% confidence level) in the specification with time-
fixed eﬀects, only. Yet, the positive and weakly significant coeﬃcient for  suggests that
the sovereign may partly ground on domestic indebtedness her decision to default.
All in all, the regression analysis for Brazil provides a fairly strong support to the model
as 9 out of 10 predicted relations are either fully (5) or partially (4) validated in the data.
5 Conclusion
By combining the contingent claims analysis and the balance sheet view of the sovereign
economy, we have derived a pricing model for sovereign credit spreads that account for
contagion eﬀects throughout the economy. With endogenously determined recovery rates,
the model-implied credit spreads can be related to observable macroeconomic quantities.
To the best of our knowledge, some of these relations (and in particular contagion eﬀects)
have not been explicitly measured in the literature.
The model is successfully tested on the Brazilian economy. Admittedly, a more com-
prehensive assessment of the approach requires implementing the model on other countries,
and this is left for future research.
Extensions of the model include adding domestic lenders (i.e. banks) into the renego-
tiation process. This would allow to explicitly account for an additional contagion eﬀect
emanating from the banking sector. Furthermore, the assumption of equal treatment be-
tween domestic and foreign lenders could be relaxed. But empirical evidence indicates that,
in the absence of any systematic bias, a case-by-case approach should be adopted.
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Appendix
Debt valuation
We will detail the proof for the valuation of domestic debt. Foreign debt is valued
along the same line of reasoning with  replaced by  and  replaced by  . Domestic
debtholders receive a payment  every time sovereign industrial production  is above .
Otherwise, they receive the reduced payment . Consequently, the no-arbitrage value of
domestic debt is given by
 () = 
µ

Z +∞
0
−1+ 
Z +∞
0
−1≤
¶

where 1 denotes the indicator function for the event . Using the strong solution for the
geometric Brownian motion, the latter can be rewritten as
 ( ) = 
µ

Z +∞
0
−1+(−2 ) 1 ln  + 
Z +∞
0
−1+(−2 )≤ 1 ln  
¶

Consider the change of probability measure using the following Radon-Nykodym derivative
exp
∙
−
³
 −

2
´
 − 1
2
³
 −

2
´2 ¸ 
Under the new measure, we know from Girsanov theorem that f :=  + ¡ − 2 ¢  is a
Brownian motion. The domestic debt value is now given by
 ( ) = eµ Z +∞
0
−−22 1 1 ln  + 
Z +∞
0
−−22 1≤ 1 ln  
¶

where e () denotes the expectation operator under the new measure and  =  − 2 .
The resolvent operator of the Brownian motion yields (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve,
1991, for a definition, and François and Morellec, 2008, for applications):
 () , E
µZ +∞
0
− ()
¶
=
1√
2
Z +∞
−∞
 () −||
√
2
Which yields in our case
 ( ) =  1p
2 + 2
Z +∞
1
 ln


−||
√
2+2
+ 1p
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
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Note that this expression depends on the sign of 1 ln

 , that is, on the relative position of
the state variable with respect to the renegotiation threshold. For   , we obtain
 ( ) =  1p
2 + 2
Z 0
1
 ln


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√
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
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Which yields, after some algebra,
 ( ) =  −
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For  ≤ , we obtain
 ( ) =  1p
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Which yields, after some algebra,
 () =  +
(1− ) 
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Therefore, the final expression for the domestic debt value is
 () =
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Financial guarantee valuation
The proof is similar to that of debt valuation. The no-arbitrage value of the financial
guarantee is given by
 ( ) = 
µ
max (0  −  − )
Z +∞
0
−1≤
¶

which can also be written as
 () = eµmax (0  −  − )Z +∞
0
−−22 1≤ 1 ln  
¶

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The resolvent operator yields
 () = max (0  −  − ) 1p
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For   , we obtain
 () = max (0  −  − )³
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For  ≤ , we obtain
 ( ) = max (0  −  − ) −
max (0  −  − )
2 + 2 − 
p
2 + 2
µ

¶− 1√2+2− 
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Tables
Table 1: World Bank indicators used as parameter proxies
Indicator name World Bank code Proxy
Deposit interest rate FR.INR.DPST 
GDP growth NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
Merchandise exports to high-income economies TX.VAL.MRCH.HI.ZS 2
External debt stocks (% of GDP) DT.DOD.DECT.GD.ZS 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS 
Broad money (% of GDP) FM.LBL.BMNY.GD.ZS 
Table 1 lists the World Bank variables selected to proxy for seven model parameters. The
remaining two parameters are the world interest rate ( ) and volatility (), which will be estimated
with a specific procedure.
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Table 2: Model calibration
Sovereign Foreign Domestic Corporate
discount Growth Volat. debt debt debt Deposit
rate (%) rate (%) (%) service service service flow
      
Argentina 10.61 3.13 30.19 65.19 35.64 17.26 26.72
Brazil 20.78 2.87 17.56 29.00 74.90 37.59 45.69
Ecuador 14.42 3.30 14.61 61.39 23.22 25.10 23.33
Indonesia 14.97 3.96 27.71 68.42 50.39 32.34 44.51
Mexico 9.91 2.28 9.85 29.81 37.27 20.27 27.53
Nigeria 12.27 4.97 15.00 57.17 17.60 16.50 19.69
Philippines 6.89 4.18 11.68 61.49 59.30 38.46 56.99
Romania 24.14 2.97 16.28 37.05 24.27 17.92 28.06
Russia 17.11 3.30 24.91 42.22 28.03 22.41 25.49
South Africa 10.71 3.29 14.51 17.08 164.08 133.12 59.98
Thailand 4.71 3.22 13.63 49.05 138.31 119.28 104.32
Turkey 48.95 3.96 17.90 43.23 42.62 21.84 33.61
Venezuela 18.59 2.87 17.43 35.29 17.99 13.88 20.03
Base case 15 3 20 40 40 30 30
Table 2 reports the average values of World Bank data over the 1995—2009 period for a selection
of major participants in the sovereign debt market. Debt services and deposit flows are expressed
as a percentage of GDP, which implies normalizing the state variable initial value to  = 100.
Volatility is the standard deviation of log-returns on GDP growth. The last line reports the base
case selected for model simulation. The world interest rate (= 0035) is the average 3-month
U.S. Treasury Bill over the 1995—2009 period.
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Table 3: Regression analysis
Specification
Sign 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 2.501*** 4.147*** 6.511*** 5.543*** 5.159*** 4.587***
Model outputs
ln () + 0.615*** 0.281***
∗ − −0.052*** 0.031**
∗ − −4.254*** −2.328***
Determinants
 + 0.035*** 0.018***
 − −0.113*** −0.237***
 − −3.465** 1.359
 + 0.015*** 0.013***
 + 0.026*** 0.004
 0 −0.014 1.962*
 − 0.004 −0.039***
 + 0.006 −0.025
Time-fixed
eﬀects? No Yes No Yes No Yes
# obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169
Adj. 2 0.672 0.846 0.355 0.841 0.838 0.920
Table 3 reports the regression results. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
observed Brazilian credit spreads. Model output regressors are: the natural logarithm of model-
implied credit spreads (ln ()), distance-to-default (∗) and recovery rate (∗). Determinant
regressors are: sovereign deposit rate (), U.S. Treasury Bill 3-month rate ( ), GDP growth rate
(), estimated state variable volatility (), external debt ( ), domestic debt (), corporate debt
(), and deposits (). The column "Sign" indicates the positive (+), negative (−) or absence of
(0) relation predicted by the model. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: Balance-sheet model of the sovereign economy
Sector Assets Liabilities and net worth
Corporate corporate assets
loans
equity
Banking
loans
domestic debt
financial guarantee
deposits
equity
Public
public assets and
monetary prerogative
sovereign equity
domestic debt
external debt
The elements in italics are considered as fixed inputs, while the elements in bold are outputs.
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Figure 2: Balance-sheet model of the sovereign economy
under contingent claims analysis
Sector Assets Liabilities
Corporate −
 (  ∗ )
 (  ∗ )
Banking
 (  ∗ )
 ( )
 ( )

 ()
Public 
 ()
 ( )
 ( )
.
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Figure 3: Determinants of sovereign credit spreads:
Discount rates and GDP dynamics
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
rd
50
100
150
200
250
300
cs
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
rf
20
40
60
80
100
120
cs
0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040
m
50
100
150
200
250
300
cs
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
s
50
100
150
200
250
300
cs
Figure 3 displays sovereign credit spreads () in basis points as a function of the sovereign
discount rate (top left graph), world interest rate (top right graph), GDP drift (bottom left graph),
and GDP volatility (bottom right graph). All other parameter values are those of the base case.
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Figure 4: Determinants of sovereign credit spreads:
Debt services and deposit flow
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Figure 4 displays sovereign credit spreads () in basis points as a function of external debt flow
(top-left graph), domestic debt flow (top-right graph), corporate debt flow (bottom-left graph), and
deposit flow (bottom-right graph). All other parameter values are those of the base case.
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Figure 5: Dynamics of model inputs for Brazil
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Figure 5 reports the evolution of corporate debt (), domestic debt (), foreign debt ( ) and
deposits () for Brazil. All values are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Data span the 1995—2009
period and come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
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Figure 6: Estimated volatility for Brazil
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Figure 6 shows Brazil’s estimated volatility from the iterative procedure. The spikes in the
graph represent the volatility coeﬃcients estimated on an annual basis (at the end of each year).
Monthly estimates are then obtained from linear interpolation.
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Figure 7: Model-implied and observed Brazilian credit spreads
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The solid line represents the JP Morgan EMBI Brazil spread. The dashed line represents the
theoretical sovereign credit spreads implied by the model.
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